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INTRODUCTION

We had the privilege of knowing Roger Goebel for over thirty
years and meeting him regularly in New York, Brussels, and elsewhere
in Europe. We never failed to be struck by his truly encyclopedic
knowledge of EU law, which must be virtually unique outside the
European Union (“EU”) itself and extremely rare within it. Having
* Professor City Law School (London), Visiting Professor Queen Mary University
(London), Barrister, Essex Court Chambers.
** Professor, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and Barrister, Monckton Chambers.
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discussed a wide range of EU legal issues with him almost every
summer for over thirty years, we feel sure that the subject of this
contribution would have been of particular interest to him.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the recent case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) on religion. Religion
is mentioned in a number of instruments in the EU legal order but until
relatively recently none of these have been the subject of case-law. In
the last couple of years there have been a number of interpretative
judgments of the CJEU which have imbued these provisions with a
degree of precision which has clarified their scope, resulting in a more
easily identifiable and enforceable body of rights.
The structure of this Article is as follows. Part II sets out a
chronological survey of the relevant provisions on religion in the EU
legal order. Part III considers two key concepts, namely “religion or
belief” and “religious organizations.” Part IV discusses the status of
religious organizations within the European Union. Part V analyzes an
important and controversial recent judgment on freedom of religion
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Part VI concerns
discrimination on the grounds of religion; and Part VII contains the
conclusion.
II. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS: A CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY
Until twenty years ago, moral issues including religion were the
preserve of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and only
arose tangentially before the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”).1 The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 1997 and
came into force in May 1999, introduced religion into EU law in two
provisions: Article 13 and Declaration 11 annexed to that Treaty.
Article 13, now Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”), provides for the adoption of legislation to
combat discrimination on the grounds of “sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” Council
Directive 2000/78, which establishes a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation (“the Framework

1. See, e.g., Case C-196/87, Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1988 E.C.R. 6169
(measure imposing a restriction on free movement on a member of the Bhagwan community
from another Member State); Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs & Excise v. Schindler,
1994 E.C.R. I-1078, ¶ 60 (establishing gambling restrictions).
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Employment Directive,” or “Directive 200/78,” or “the Directive”), 2 is
at issue in a number of the cases discussed below is based on this
provision. Second, Declaration 11 on the status of churches and nonconfessional organizations was appended to the Treaty
of
Amsterdam. 3
As expressed in Article 1 of the Framework Employment,
Directive, its purpose is to lay down a general framework for
combating discrimination on a number of grounds, including religion
or belief, as it regards employment or occupation. The Framework
Employment Directive has been described as performing an
“exclusionary function.” It excludes religion from the range of
permissible reasons an employer may legitimately invoke in order to
treat one employee (or a group of employees) less favorably than
another. 4
The Framework Employment Directive applies to all persons who
exercise an economic activity either in an employed or self-employed
capacity, in the public or private sector, 5 with respect to conditions of
access to employment or self-employment, working conditions, and
related matters. 6 It provides for five exceptions to the principle of equal
treatment. 7 Additionally, Member States are given the discretion to
make certain exceptions from some of its provisions. Such exceptions
are subject to the principle of proportionality, that is their objective
must be legitimate and the means employed to achieve that objective
must be necessary.
Amongst the exceptions, which Member States may make to the
provision of the Directive, two are relevant to the present discussion.
2. Council Directive 2000/78/EC to Establish a General Framework for Equal Treatment
in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 [hereinafter Framework Employment
Directive].
3. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997 (C 340) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
4. Case C-303/06, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law & Steve Law, Opinion of Advocate
General Maduro, 2008 E.C.R. I-5603, ¶ 18.
5. Framework Employment Directive, supra note 2, art. 3(1).
6. Id.
7. Examples include: measures laid down by national law in the interests of public
security, public order, the protection of health and the rights and freedom of others. Id. art. 2(5).
Other examples involve differences in treatment based on nationality or conditions relating to
the entry and residence of third country nationals and stateless persons and the payment of any
kind by the state including state social security schemes or social protection schemes. Id. art.
3(2), 3(3).
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Article 4(1) of the Framework Employment Directive provides that
differences in treatment may be permitted by Member States where
they are “based on a characteristic required for a particular occupation.”
Article 4(2) of the Framework Employment Directive relates to
occupational activities within churches and other public or private
organizations, the ethos of which is based upon religion or belief. In
such cases, a difference of treatment based upon a person’s religion or
belief does not “constitute discrimination where, by reason of the
nature of the activities or the context in which they are carried out, a
person’s religion or belief constitutes a genuine, legitimate and justified
occupational requirement having regard to the organization’s ethos.”
Article 9 of the Framework Employment Directive requires
Member States to provide administrative and/or judicial remedies for
the enforcement of obligations under the Directive. Article 10 further
obliges Member States to take necessary measures to ensure that, where
a claimant establishes before a court or other competent authority facts
from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination, the
burden falls on the respondent to prove that there has been no breach
of the principle of equal treatment.
Also, in 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union 8 (“the Charter”) was promulgated. For present purposes, the
most important provision is Article 10, which is entitled “Freedom of
thought, conscience and religion.” The only relevant paragraph is the
first one, which reads:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.

This wording is identical to that of Article 9(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). 9 Consequently, according to
Article 52(3) of the Charter, “the meaning and scope of the rights
concerned shall be the same as those laid down by the said
Convention,” although EU law may ensure “more extensive
protection.” Given the dearth of case law to date on Article 10 of the
8. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereinafter
the Charter].
9. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9(1),
Nov. 4, 1956, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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Charter, the rulings of the ECtHR are likely to play a particularly
important role for some time. What is more, Article 21 of the Charter
prohibits discrimination on a range of grounds, including “religion or
belief.”
Crucially, Article 51(1) of the Charter unambiguously states that
the Charter only applies to the acts and omissions of the EU’s
institutions and bodies, and to the Member States when they are
“implementing EU law.” Beyond the scope of the Treaties, the
European Union has no vocation to act as a human rights
organization, 10 a point reinforced by Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the
European Union (“TEU”) which reads: “The provisions of the Charter
shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in
the Treaties.”
Moreover, the rights enshrined in Articles 10 and 21(1) are not
absolute, 11 but may be justified pursuant to Article 52(1) of the Charter,
which is drafted in the following terms:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms
recognized by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect
the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle
of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and
freedoms of others.

With the Treaty of Lisbon entering into force on December 1,
2009, the wording of the Charter underwent some important changes,
although the provisions cited above were not affected. 12 In addition, the
Lisbon Treaty fundamentally altered the status of the Charter. From
being a non-binding instrument, it was transformed into a binding act
with “the same legal value as the Treaties.” 13
10. This is subject to one exception: under Article 7 TEU, which applies where a Member
State is found to have committed a “serious and persistent breach” of the principles of the rule
of law, democracy and human rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU; in that event, the rights of that
Member State, including its voting rights in the Council, may be suspended. The majorities
required for the imposition of such sanctions are so high that they have never been imposed,
although Poland is currently threatened with them – unlike Hungary, although its government is
equally at odds with the EU’s fundamental values set out in Article 2 TEU.
11. A few of the rights set out in the Charter appear to be absolute. That is certainly the
case as regards human dignity, since Article 1 provides: “Human dignity is inviolable.” No
doubt, the right to life (Article 2) is also absolute. Id. arts. 1, 2, 52(1)
12. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].
13. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 12, art. 6(1).
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The Treaty of Lisbon also inserted a new provision into the EU
Treaties: Article 17 of the TFEU. The first two paragraphs read:
1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under
national law of churches and religious associations or communities
in the Member States.
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of
philosophical and non-confessional organizations.

This provision replaces, and is identical in substance to, Declaration 11
to the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will be discussed further in Part 4.
III. KEY CONCEPTS
Central to any discussion of religion in the EU legal order are the
related concepts of “religion or belief” and “religious organization.”
These concepts appear in all the legal provisions under discussion but
are not defined in any. It has thus been left to the CJEU to define their
content.
A. “Religion or Belief”: A Broad Concept
As noted earlier, the first sentence of Article 10 of the Charter
(like the first sentence of its counterpart, Article 9(1) of the ECHR)
speaks of “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”
The term “relief or belief” does not appear until the second sentence,
and then merely in passing. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that
there is any difference between the two terms; and, since the words
“religion or belief” also feature in Article 21 of the Charter and Article
1 of Directive 2000/78, it is appropriate to concentrate on them here.
No definition of “religion or belief” can be found in any EU legal
instrument. However, as explained in Part 4 below, Article 17 of the
TFEU requires the European Union to respect the status of churches,
religious associations, or communities in the Member States under
national law. This would suggest that, if a particular creed is recognized
as a religion in a Member State, it must also be recognized as such
under EU law.
As yet, the lack of any more precise indication of what constitutes
religion or belief has not posed any great difficulty for the CJEU. The
cases which have come before it have concerned the major religions of
the world. Thus they fall squarely within the common understanding
of the concept of “religion.”
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It has been argued elsewhere that “religion or belief” may be
interpreted as going beyond organized religions involving, for
example, a belief in a divine being or a deity as well as other
philosophical beliefs on major issues such as life, death, and
morality, akin to, but not amounting to a religion. 14 This term has
been interpreted broadly by the ECtHR to extend beyond the
mainstream world religions to other groups such as Jehovah’s
Witnesses 15 and the Pentecostal Church, 16 as well as to non-religious
beliefs including atheism and agnosticism. 17 We may expect the
CJEU to take an equally broad view of what is a “religion or belief”
given the obligation in Article 52(3) of the Charter to interpret
Charter rights – in this case Article 10 – in line with the ECHR.
At the same time, in Pretty v United Kingdom the ECtHR held
that “not all opinions or convictions constitute beliefs.” 18
Consequently, however firm the applicant’s view that as a motor
neuron disease sufferer she had a right to assisted suicide, Article 9
of the ECHR was not engaged. From this ruling one can perhaps
deduce that even a moral conviction on an issue of the utmost
importance will not qualify, if it relates to an isolated question and
does not form part of a world view. However, this point was not
spelled out in the judgment.
A further issue arises as to just what constitutes religion: Is it a
belief or does it extend to the practices and tenets of that belief? The
CJEU has taken a broad view of this issue. In Achbita 19 and
Bougnaoui, 20 the CJEU held that “religion” in Article 10(1) of the
Charter had to be interpreted broadly as covering both the forum
14. EVELYN ELLIS & PHILIPPA WATSON, EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 36 (2nd ed.,
2012).
15. Hoffmann v. Austria, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293 (1993).
16. Larissis et al. v. Greece, 140 Eur. H.R. Rep. 958 (1998).
17. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, ¶ 31 (1993).
18. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 39 (2002); see THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 736 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 2018).
19. Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, 2017, ¶ 27, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0157&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/RAN9-VE8B].
20. Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017, ¶ 30, http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188853&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&m
ode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13275247
[https://perma.cc/86RL-AUSD].
See
EMMANUELLE BRIBOSIA & ISABELLE RORIVE, AFFAIRES ACHBITA ET BOUGNAOUI : ENTRE
NEUTRALITE ET PREJUGES Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2017), at 1017-37; Mark
Bell, Leaving Religion at the Door? The European Court of Justice and Religious Symbols in
the Workplace, 17 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 784 (2017).
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internum (that is the fact of having a belief) and the forum externum
(which is the manifestation of religious faith in public). 21 The latter
included the wearing of the Islamic scarf by Muslim women. In
reaching this conclusion the Court followed the case law of the
ECtHR. 22
In Liga van Moskeeen en Islamitische Organisaties, 23 specific
methods of slaughtering prescribed by religious rituals were held to
fall within the scope of Article 10 of the Charter. The CJEU held that
the classification of a particular practice or ritual as a religious rite
falling within Article 10 of the Charter cannot be affected by
theological differences on the subject. It thus refused to be
influenced by theological debate within the Muslim community as
to whether the obligation to slaughter animals without prior stunning
during the Feast of Sacrifice is absolute. 24
B.

“Religious Organization:” A Question of Self-Perception?

As a general rule, religious organizations are subject to EU law
save where they are expressly granted certain exemptions or
privileges. But who decides what is a religious organization? Is it for
an organization to declare itself to be a religious body or to embrace a
particular ethos and thus to have autonomy in its employment policy?
Or can its self-perception be challenged?

21. This two-fold aspect of religious belief and practice had already been stressed in Case
C-71/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y & Z, 2012, ¶ 62, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=126364&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8188508 [https://perma.cc/8JAY-H3HH]. This case concerned
the right to asylum.
22. See Eweida et al. v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2013). The case law of the
ECtHR on religious apparel is summarized by AG Sharpston in Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v.
Micropole SA, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 2016, ¶ 45, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?docid=181584&doclang=en [https://perma.cc/J2L2-SBN6]; see also
Gérard Gonzalez, Liberté de religion au sein de l’entreprise, in CONVENTION DES DROITS DE
L’HOMME ET DROIT DE L’ENTREPRISE 61 (Laure Milano ed., 2019).
23. Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen
VZW v. Viaams Gewest, 2018, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=202301&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1327
6063 [https://perma.cc/LKD8-9N8W] [hereinafter Liga].
24. C-426/16, Liga, ¶ 50. An issue which was not raised before the Court was whether
religious practices are to be viewed objectively or subjectively: to what extent should the Court
attach importance to a person’s firmly held belief that a particular practice is an integral part of
her religion, even though others practicing the same religion might not share that view?
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This issue has been addressed in the recent case of IR v. JQ,25
which concerned the employment policy of a Catholic hospital, IR.
This institution is primarily a non-profit organization whose purpose
is to carry out the work of Caritas (the international confederation of
Catholic organizations), inter alia by running hospitals. 26 It is
subject to the supervision of the Archbishop of Cologne. JQ is a
Catholic doctor who was dismissed by IR for failing to adhere to the
tenets of the Catholic church. 27
Advocate General Wathelet began his Opinion by considering
whether “IR is a private organization the ethos of which is based on
religion.” 28 This, he said, was a question of fact which was for the
national court to determine. 29 He proceeded to give some indication
of the factors which the national court might take into consideration
in making its determination. 30 The circumstance that IR was subject
to supervision by the Catholic Archbishop of Cologne and that its
corporate objective is the implementation of the missions of Caritas
was not sufficient in itself to establish that its ethos is based on
religion. 31 That would have to be established by looking at its
activities, in particular the healthcare services which it provides.
Were these services provided in accordance with the doctrine of the
Catholic church and therefore distinguishable from services
provided by public hospitals? This determination must address
ethical questions relating to healthcare which are of particular
importance in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and in particular
abortion, euthanasia, contraception, and other measures to regulate
procreation. 32
Interestingly, the Court did not address this issue in its
judgment, but simply proceeded on the basis that IR’s claim to be a
religious organization was well founded. This approach may be
queried. Where an entity claims special treatment under EU law on
25. Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=205521&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1
3276727 [https://perma.cc/E8LP-NJYX]
26. Id. ¶ 23.
27. See id. ¶¶ 24-26.
28. Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 2018 ¶ 45,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=202426&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13276727 [https://perma.cc/4FM2-5BHW].
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. ¶ 47.
32. Id.
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the grounds that it is a religious organization or has a particular
ethos, the first step should be to ascertain whether this is in fact so.
IV. THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Before considering the effects of Article 17 of the TFEU, it must be
pointed out that the Member States have put in place a vast array of
arrangements for their religious organizations: at one end of the
spectrum is France, where the State is strongly secular 33 and at the other
are Denmark and the United Kingdom, which have established
churches. 34 There are countless variants in between: Germany, for
instance, has no established church but allows the recognized religious
organizations very considerable autonomy and collects members’ dues
on behalf of those organizations. 35 By the same token, national laws on
wearing religious apparel in the workplace diverge considerably. 36
Moreover, attitudes to religion vary widely between Member States,37
as do the rules applicable to such issues as the wearing of religious
apparel. However it must be noted that whatever the status of the
dominant religious organization in their territory, Member States are
required by Article 9 of the ECHR and (when acting within the scope
of the EU Treaties) Article 10 of the Charter to respect the freedom of
religion, including the rights of religious minorities. 38
33. Article 1 of the French Constitution states inter alia that the French Republic is secular.
See 1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.), http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp
[https://perma.cc/3WA9-RTSN] (French); 1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.), https://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_juillet2008.p
df [https://perma.cc/WVG4-5VN9] (English).
34. According to the Danish Constitution, the Evangelical Lutheran Church is established
in that country. DANMARKS RIGES GRUNDLOV [CONSTITUTION] [THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT
OF
DENMARK]
June
5,
1953
(Den.).
http://www.stm.dk/_p_10992.html
[https://perma.cc/FED9-JED4] In the UK, which has no written Constitution, the Anglican
Church is established in England, and the same applies to the Presbyterian Church in Scotland.
Wales and Northern Ireland no longer have established churches. As matters currently stand, the
UK is set to leave the EU on March 29, 2019.
35. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (BASIC LAW) art. 140
(Ger.), https://www.bundestag.de/grundgesetz [https://perma.cc/5RFM-AP8X]; GRUNDGESETZ
FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (BASIC LAW) art. 140 (Eng.), https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNC4-B5KV].
36. See Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, Opinion of Advocate General
Sharpston, 2016, ¶¶ 36-37, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=
181584&doclang=en [https://perma.cc/J2L2-SBN6].
37. According to a survey compiled by the Commission in 2012, 99% of (Greek) Cypriots
are avowed Christians, whereas only 34% of Czechs hold Christian beliefs. See id. ¶ 35.
38. For a particularly flagrant breach of Article 11 ECHR (freedom of assembly) read with
Article 9 ECHR, see the ECtHR judgment of 8 April 2014 in Magyar Keresztény Mennonita
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The diversity of the Member States’ arrangements in this regard
underlies the first judicial pronouncement from Luxembourg on Article
17(1), namely the following statement from Advocate General Kokott
in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania: “Article 17
TFEU gives specific effect to and complements the more general
requirement enshrined in Article 4(2) TEU on respect for the national
identity of the Member States inherent in their fundamental political
and constitutional structures.” 39 Insofar as is material here, Article 4(2)
of the TEU requires the European Union to respect the “national
identities” of the Member States, “inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional structures, political and
constitutional . . . .” Significantly, despite its obvious importance, even
where national identity under this provision is at stake, Member States
do not enjoy unbridled freedom to do as they please: the measure in
question must still be proportionate to the aim pursued. 40
Equally telling is the very next paragraph of Advocate General
Kokott’s Opinion in the same case:
There is no doubt that Article 17 TFEU gives expression to the
particular role played in society by churches in the Member States.
The provision cannot, however, be construed as a sectoral
exception under which the activity of the churches in general is
seen as taking place outside the scope of EU law. In particular, EU
law must come into play where churches are economically active
. . . 41

A striking illustration of this principle can be seen in the ruling of the
Grand Chamber in the same case: it held, albeit without addressing
Egyház & Others v. Hungary, Application 70945/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014). The Hungarian
government had withdrawn official recognition from the overwhelming majority of religious
organizations in the country, thereby depriving them of privileges, subsidies and donations.
Hungary has never fully complied with this ruling. See generally THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 753-54.
39. Case C-74/16, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania v. Getafe, Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, 2017, ¶ 31, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:62016CC0074&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/8X5Y-5XQD]
[hereinafter
Congregación de Escuelas Pías]. See Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV,
2017, ¶ 125, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ01
57&from=EN [https://perma.cc/RAN9-VE8B].
40. See, e.g., Case C-202/11, Las v. Antwerp, 2013, ¶ 29, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0202:EN:HTML
[https://perma.cc/6JZ5HHJ5]; Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Wien, 2010 E.C.R. I-13693, ¶ 83.
41. Case C-74/16, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Congregación de Escuelas Pías,
¶ 32.
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Article 17 TFEU, that an educational tax concession granted to the
Spanish Catholic Church pursuant to an agreement between Spain and
the Holy See might be a State aid contrary to Article 107 TFEU. 42
Similarly, in Egenberger 43 it was held that Article 17 could not be
relied on to prevent a disappointed applicant for a job with a German
Protestant association, who claimed to have suffered from religious
discrimination contrary to Directive 2000/78, from obtaining an
effective remedy. The defendant’s case was based on Article 17
together with German case law to the effect that the courts must defer
to the church’s own perception of what activities were inextricably
linked to its own ethos in such a way that membership was a necessary
requirement for carrying them out. 44 However, this approach was
rejected. The Court stressed that, while “Article 17 TFEU expresses the
neutrality of the European Union towards the organization by the
Member States of their relations with churches and religious
associations and communities,” it did not dispense such bodies from
complying with the relevant provisions of EU law, 45 namely Article 47
of the Charter on the right to an effective remedy and Articles 9 and 10
of the Directive. This highly important ruling was subsequently
confirmed in IR v. JQ. 46
In addition, in the Finnish Jehovah’s Witnesses case, the Court
ruled that the EU’s data protection legislation did not interfere with the
“organizational autonomy” of religious entities protected by Article
17. 47 The organization was therefore required to abide by that
legislation.
Moreover, according to Advocate General Tanchev, Article 17
cannot be understood to mean that the European Union must give its
blessing to breaches of fundamental rights suffered by any of the bodies
referred to in that provision at the hands of the Member States. 48 More
42. Id.
43. Case C-414/16, Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie, 2017, at ¶¶ 55-59,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=201148&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13282861 [https://perma.cc/H32X-2RTG].
44. Id. at 31, 55-59.
45. Id. ¶ 15.
46. Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, 2018, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=205521&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1
3290771 [https://perma.cc/DMY6-MALS].
47. Case C-25/17, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Jehovan Todistajat, Opinion of Advocate
General Mengozzi, 2018, ¶ 74, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=
CELEX%3A62017CC0025 [https://perma.cc/7C4Q-RX2N].
48. C-414/16, Egenberger, ¶ 89.
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specifically, the case law of the ECtHR on Articles 9 and 11 of the
ECHR may not be disregarded by the European Union “in the event of
a diminution under the law of a Member State of the status of churches,
religious organizations and communities, or philosophical and nonconfessional organizations.” 49 On this view, to take some extreme
cases, the European Union could not give its blessing to a Member
State’s decision to recognize only the dominant religion and ban all
others, or indeed to prohibit all forms of religion.
To date, neither the Court nor the Advocates-General have ruled
on Article 17(2). Consequently, there is no authority from the Court as
to the meaning of “philosophical and non-confessional organizations.”
It would certainly cover such groups as the Humanists in the United
Kingdom 50 and some, if not all, associations of free masons. 51 The one
point which appears to be clear is that paragraphs 1 and 2 are mutually
exclusive. In any case, much of the case law on Article 17(1) can no
doubt be applied mutatis mutandis to Article 17(2).
Finally, it could be argued that, according to this case law, Article
17 adds nothing to Article 4(2) of the TEU as a matter of pure law.
Needless to say, no provision can be interpreted in such a manner as to
render it meaningless. However, the fact is that on any view Article 17
serves to emphasize the importance of respecting the status of national
law of religious, philosophical, and non-confessional organizations –
provided that, as Advocate General Tanchev aptly points out, the
Member States themselves act in compliance with the ECHR and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights.
V. ARTICLE 10 OF THE CHARTER
Article 10 of the Charter was in issue in Liga Van Moskeeen,52
which concerned a decision by the competent authorities in Flanders to
stop authorizing the ritual slaughter of animals without stunning in
temporary slaughterhouses in certain Belgian communes during the
49. Id. ¶ 91 (emphasis in the original). This assertion may have been prompted by the
Hungarian case referred to Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014).
50. HUMANISTS UK, https://humanism.org.uk [https://perma.cc/4THJ-3RKW].
51. In France, this movement is especially well developed. See GRAND ORIENT DE
FRANCE,
http://www.godf.org/index.php/accueil/index/liens/accueil/nom/Accueil
[https://perma.cc/EA6Z-J6JL].
52. Case C-426/16, Liga, 2018, ¶ 45, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=202301&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&ci
d=13276063 [https://perma.cc/LKD8-9N8W].
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Muslim Feast of Sacrifice. Initially, the Belgian authorities had
provided temporary slaughterhouses to cater for increased demand for
ritual slaughtering during this festival. But, in September 2014, the
Flemish Regional Minister announced that from 2015 he would no
longer authorize the use of temporary slaughterhouses at which ritual
slaughtering could be practiced during that period, on the grounds that
such licenses were contrary to Article 4 of Regulation 1099/2009 53(the
“Regulation”). Article 4(1) lays down common rules for the protection
of animal welfare at the time of slaughter or killing in the European
Union. However, Article 4(4) reads: “In the case of animals subject to
particular methods of slaughter prescribed by religious rites, the
requirements of paragraph 1 shall not apply provided that the slaughter
takes place in a slaughterhouse.” The term “slaughterhouse” is defined
in Article 2(k) of the Regulation as an establishment which meets the
requirements of Regulation 853/2004. 54 The temporary slaughter
houses in question did not comply with these requirements.
The applicants in the main proceedings challenged the Minister’s
decision on a number of grounds. In particular, they claimed that
Article 4(4) of the Regulation was incompatible with Article 10 of the
Charter and Article 9 ECHR. Addressing this issue, following a
reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court, relying on the judgment
of the ECtHR concerning the ritual slaughter of animals prescribed by
the Jewish faith, 55 began by finding that the specific methods of
slaughter prescribed by religious rituals fell within the scope of Article
10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Next, it turned to the central point, namely whether the rule laid
down in Article 4(4) read together with Article 2(k) constitutes a
restriction on the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 10 of the
Charter. The Court concluded that it did not. It reasoned as follows:
The slaughtering arrangements laid down by Regulation 1099/2009
apply to any slaughter of animals within the European Union. 56 They
apply in a general and neutral manner to any party which organizes the
slaughtering of animals irrespective of a connection with a particular
53. Id. ¶¶ 13-16.
54. Regulation 853/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004
Laying Down Specific Hygiene Rules for on the Hygiene of Foodstuffs, art. 2(k), 2004 O.J. (L
139) 55 (EC).
55. Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74.
56. Council Regulation 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the Protection of Animals at
the Time of Killing, 2009 O.J. (L 303) 1 (EC).
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religion and consequently concern in a non-discriminatory manner all
producers of meat in the European Union. The main objective of
Regulation 1099/2009 was the protection of animal welfare; and that
could only be ensured if ritual slaughter was carried out in a slaughter
house which complied with the technical specifications laid down for
approved slaughterhouses in Regulation 853/2004. 57
In addition, the referring court asked whether the requirement that
animals could only be slaughtered in approved slaughter houses might
hinder the practice of ritual slaughter for many practicing Muslims in
Flanders and thus limit their freedom of religion. On this point, the
Court was dismissive. It acknowledged that the establishment, at the
expense of the Muslim Community, of new, approved slaughterhouses
or the conversion of temporary slaughter houses into approved
slaughter houses would require huge financial investments.58
Nevertheless, it held that the present case “concerns only a limited
number of municipalities in the Flemish Region.” 59 A “lack of
slaughter capacity in a region of a Member State which occurs
temporarily, related to the increase in demand for ritual slaughter over
several days during the Feast of Sacrifice, arises from a combination of
domestic circumstances which could not affect the validity” of the
relevant provisions of Regulation 1099/2009. 60
With respect, this reasoning amounts to making fundamental
rights subject to a de minimis rule, which is manifestly a contradiction
in terms. As already mentioned, the freedom of religion is not an
absolute right so that in many circumstances “the rights and freedoms
of others” must prevail. 61 However, to say that a person may not rely
on that fundamental right because only a small geographic area is
affected is quite another matter. What is more, this case does not
concern an isolated event, since the problem will arise every year.
Additionally, the Court showed a cavalier approach to the
considerable expenses which would, by its own admission, be incurred
by the Muslim community, should they wish to comply with their
religious obligations.
57. Id.; Regulation 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 Laying Down Specific Hygiene Rules for on the Hygiene of Foodstuffs, 2004 O.J. (L
139/55) (EC).
58. Regulation 853/2004, supra note 57, ¶ 70.
59. Regulation 853/2004, supra note 57, ¶ 73.
60. Regulation 853/2004, supra note 57, ¶ 78.
61. Charter, supra note 8, art. 52(1).
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VI. DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF RELIGION
A. General
The Framework Employment Directive 62 (“Directive”) prohibits
discrimination, inter alia, on the grounds of religion or belief in the
workplace. 63 Article 2 of the Directive adopts a broad definition of
discriminatory conduct. 64 It prohibits both direct and indirect
discrimination and instructions to discriminate against a person on
any of the grounds to which it relates. 65
Direct discrimination is defined as the less favorable treatment
of one person over another in a comparable situation on the grounds
of religion or belief. 66 Indirect discrimination is said to occur where
“an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons having a particular religion or belief . . . at a particular
disadvantage compared with other persons” in the absence of objective
justification. 67 Harassment in the sense of unwanted conduct taking
place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person
and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or
offensive environment is deemed to be a form of discrimination. 68
B. Religious apparel: Muslim headscarves
The first two judgments on religious discrimination were handed
down by the CJEU on March 14, 2017. 69 They concerned the wearing
of religious apparel in the work place, an issue which had already been
the subject of consideration by the ECtHR. One case was a preliminary
reference from the Belgian Court of Cassation, the highest civil court
in the country; 70 the other was a reference from its French

62. Framework Employment Directive, supra note 2.
63. Id. art. 1.
64. Id. art 2.
65. Id. art. 2(4).
66. Id. art. 2(2)(a),
67. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
68. Id. art. 2(3).
69. Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, 2017, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62015CJ0157&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/RAN9-VE8B]; Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188853&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13275247 [https://perma.cc/86RL-AUSD].
70. Case C-157/15, Achbita, ¶ 21.
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counterpart. 71 Both concerned female employees who wished to wear
the Islamic veil at their respective places of work. Samira Achbita
began to work for G4S in February 2003 as a receptionist under a
contract of indefinite duration. G4S is a private undertaking, which
provides, inter alia, reception services for customers in both the private
and public sectors. 72 G4S had a policy of “neutrality,” which meant
that workers could not wear visible signs of their political,
philosophical, or religious beliefs in the workplace. 73 In April 2006,
Ms. Achbita informed her line managers that she intended to wear an
Islamic headscarf during working hours in the future. 74
The management of G4S informed her that this would not be
tolerated because it would be contrary to its policy of neutrality. 75 G4S
did not accept that its employees could wear any visible sign of a
political, religious, or philosophical affiliation at work. Since she
persisted in this course of conduct, she was dismissed. 76 She contested
the legitimacy of her dismissal before the Belgian courts. The case
ultimately came before the Cour de Cassation, which referred a
question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.
The question was simple: where an employer prohibits all
employees from wearing outward signs of political, philosophical, and
religious beliefs at the workplace, should Article 2(2)(a) of the
Framework Employment Directive be interpreted as meaning that the
prohibition on a female Muslim wearing a headscarf at the workplace
does not constitute direct discrimination? The Court replied that the
internal rule in question treated all GS4 workers the same way by
requiring them all, without distinction, to dress neutrally. 77
There was no evidence that the rule in question was applied
differently to Ms. Achbita as compared to any other worker.
Consequently, the rule did not introduce a difference in treatment that
was directly based on religion or belief. 78
Having found no direct discrimination in the treatment of Ms.
Achbita, the CJEU conceded that the referring court might find that the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui.
Case C-157/15, Achbita, ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. ¶ 31.
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internal rule introduced a difference in treatment which was indirectly
based on religion or belief; and it was for that court to ascertain whether
an apparently neutral rule put persons adhering to a particular religion
or belief at a disadvantage. 79 The Court went on to find that such a
difference in treatment did not amount to indirect discrimination, if it
was justified by a legitimate aim and was proportionate to the
attainment of that aim. 80
Then came the usual approach of the Court, which is to say that,
while it is for the national court to deal with all these matters—the
legitimacy of the alleged aim of the differential treatment and the
validity of the means of attaining that aim in the light of the principle
of proportionality—it would provide guidance to the national court to
enable to give judgment on these matters. It proceeded to lay down the
following principles:
(i) a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality on the
part of a business in its relations with its customers must be
considered legitimate, notably where the employer confines this
policy to those workers who are required to come into contact with
the employer’s customers;
(ii) to prohibit employees from wearing visible signs of political,
philosophical or religious beliefs is appropriate for ensuring that a
policy of neutrality is properly applied, provided that the policy is
genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner;
(iii) it fell to the national court to determine whether the
prohibition was necessary to achieve the policy of neutrality. This
would be the case if the prohibition on the visible wearing of any
sign or clothing capable of being associated with a religious faith
or a political or philosophical belief covered only G4S workers
who interact with customers.

Importantly, the Court, added that it was for the national court to
consider whether, instead of dismissing Ms. Achibita, it would have
been possible to offer her alternative employment, which did not
involve any visual contact with G4S customers. 81
Without specifically articulating it, the Court appears to have
sought to balance the interests of the employee with those of the
employer: the employee’s right to practice a religion or belief and to
79. Id. ¶ 34.
80. Id. ¶¶ 36-42.
81. Id. ¶ 43.

2019]

IS THE CJEU FINDING ITS RELIGION?

865

adhere to its tenets (Article 10 of the Charter) with the employer’s right
to conduct a business (Article 16 of the Charter). 82 The latter provision
reads: “The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union
law and national laws and practices is recognized.” Unlike most of the
provisions in the Charter, this right has no counterpart in the ECHR;
rather, it was recognized as a general principle of EU law in early case
law of the CJEU on the basis of the Constitutions of certain Member
States, 83 including Article 12(1) of the German Basic Law. Needless to
say, like Articles 10 and 21(1) of the Charter, Article 16 is not absolute,
but may be justified pursuant to Article 52(1). Unsurprisingly, this is a
relatively weak right and the success rate of arguments founded on
Article 16 is generally low, but in recent years there have been some
notable exceptions. 84
In any case, this balancing exercise may require mutual
accommodation; both parties may have to adapt their respective
positions. In the case of an employer, there may be an obligation to
find, within his business organization, alternative employment for an
employee whose religious practices are in conflict with his business
interests. An employee may be required to accept such alternative
employment if he or she wishes to continue to work for the
employer, whilst still observing those religious practices which are
allegedly prejudicial to the employer’s business.
However, the position is not quite so simple. The extent to
which each may have to accommodate the other depends upon a
multiplicity of subjective factors: the level of religious observance
of the employee; his or her position within the organization; the
nature of the religious practice or its manifestation in issue; the type
and size of the business; and the profile and interest of the workforce

82. Id. ¶ 38.
83. Case 4/73, J. Nold v. Commission of the European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 491;
Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727.
84. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959 (monitoring
obligation imposed on an ISP); Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v. Parkwood Leisure Ltd., 2013,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-426/11&language=EN [https://perma.cc/H2RMU6M3] (labor law); Case C-201/15, AGET Iraklis v. Minister of Labor, Social Insurance and
Social Solidarity, 2016, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
187991&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13341725
[https://perma.cc/56G7-L2XB] (labor law). See Peter Oliver, What Purpose Does Article 16 of
the Charter Serve? in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 281
(Ulf Bernitz et al. eds, 2013); PETER J. OLIVER, THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF COMPANIES:
EUROPEAN AND US LAW COMPARED (Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2019).
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in general. 85 These are factors upon which the Advocate General
provided guidance. A small but discreetly worn religious symbol
would be more acceptable than a noticeable head-covering.
Employees required to wear a uniform could be subject to stricter
prohibitions on the wearing of religious symbols than employees
who were free to choose the clothes they wore to work. More
restraint could be expected of an employee in a high-level position
within a business giving that employee authority over others.
Employees who provide the external face of a business may be
required to behave differently than those who have back office
positions and have no contact with customers. 86
In the case of G4S, a further important factor was the nature of
its business. G4S offered services to a broad range of customers in
the public and private sectors. These services were characterized by
two factors: (i) constant face to face contact with members of the
public, and (ii) the fact that such contact reflected the image not only
of G4S but also of the company’s customers. 87 Thus, not only had
the company’s image as portrayed by the external appearance of its
workforce to be considered, but also that of its customers to whom
political, philosophical, or religious beliefs might be attributed
because of G4S’s employees’ dress. 88
As to Bougnaoui, 89 that case reached the CJEU by way of
reference from the Cour de Cassation of France. 90 These proceedings
differed from those in Achbita in that the French court approached the
case from the point of view of Article 4(1) of the Directive. Viewed
from this perspective, the question was this: was the wish of a customer
not to have services provided by a person wearing an Islamic headscarf
a “genuine and determining occupational requirement” such that an
employee could be required not to wear a headscarf? 91 Ms. Bougnaoui
took a job with Micropole, as a design engineer, beginning on July 15,
85. Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, Opinion of Advocate General
Kokott, 2017, ¶¶ 118-22, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=179082&
doclang=en [https://perma.cc/3NM9-YBW4].
86. Id. ¶¶ 118-19.
87. Id. ¶ 94.
88. Id. ¶¶ 93-94
89. Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA, 2017, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=188853&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&ci
d=13275247 [https://perma.cc/86RL-AUSD].
90. Id.
91. See id. ¶ 19.
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2008. 92 The company specialized in advice, engineering, and
specialized training for the development and integration of decisionmaking solutions prior to entering into the employment of Micropole,
a representative told Ms. Bougnaoui at a student fair that wearing an
Islamic scarf in the workplace might be problematic when she is in
contact with customers of the company. 93 In February 2008, she started
an internship with the business. When she arrived, she wore a simple
bandana, but subsequently started to wear an Islamic headscarf. Little
more than a year later she was dismissed. 94 In her letter of dismissal,
Micropole pointed out that it had been made clear at all stages of the
recruitment process that, because she would be in contact with the
company’s customers, she would not be able to wear a veil in all
circumstances.
The Court did not express any particular view on whether Ms.
Bougnaoui’s dismissal arose out of direct or indirect discrimination –
contenting itself simply with saying that these were matters for the
referring court to decide. Following its approach in Achbita, the Court
held that, if it transpired from the facts that there was a neutral rule,
which prohibited the wearing of any visible sign of political,
philosophical, or religious beliefs, and if that rule resulted in persons
adhering to a particular religion being put at a particular disadvantage,
“it would have to be concluded that there was a difference in treatment
indirectly based on religion or belief.” 95
The next question was whether Micropole’s policy was
objectively justified. Was it a legitimate aim to adopt a policy of
neutrality towards customers? If so, were the measures which the
employer took legitimate and necessary? These were matters, the Court
held, for the national court to decide.
The Court then went on to consider Article 4(1)–the provision on
which the referring court sought guidance. 96 Here the question was
whether the willingness of an employer to take account of a customer’s
wish no longer to have the services provided by a worker who wears
an Islamic headscarf constitutes a “genuine and determining

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. ¶ 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 19.
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occupational requirement.” 97 The Court’s reply was in the negative.98
It reasoned as follows: the concept of a “genuine and determining
occupational requirement” within the meaning of Article 4(1) refers to
a “requirement that is objectively dictated by the nature of the
occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are
carried out. 99 This term cannot cover "subjective considerations such
as the willingness of the employer to take account of the particular
wishes of the customer.” 100
In both cases, the Advocates General discussed to what extent
an employee could be required to modify unilaterally his or her
religious based behavior and practices in the workplace. 101 Advocate
General Kokott recognized that “for many people, religion is an
important part of their personal identity.” 102 Advocate General
Sharpston made the same point more forcefully: “I emphasize that,
to someone who is an observant member of a faith, religious identity
is an integral part of that person’s very being.” 103
Both agreed that some moderation of religious practice in the
workplace might be required. Advocate General Kokott, drawing a
distinction between sex, skin color, ethnic origin, age, or disability,
stated that a person’s religion was an “aspect of an individual’s
private life” the practice of which he may be expected to moderate
in the workplace, “be this in relation to religions practices,
religiously motivated behavior or . . . clothing.” 104 In other words, a
person can leave his religion “at the door” upon entering his
employer’s premises—an option not open to those bearing certain
other characteristics attracting discriminatory behavior such as sex,
disability and so forth. 105 Indeed, this was precisely what Ms.
Achbita did during the first three years of her employment with G4S:
she did not wear her Islamic headscarf at work. Ms. Bougnaoui also
97. Id.
98. Id. ¶ 41.
99. Id. ¶ 40.
100. Id.
101. Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, Opinion of Advocate General
Kokott, 2017, ¶¶ 117-22, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=179082&
doclang=en [https://perma.cc/3NM9-YBW4]; Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole SA,
Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 2016, ¶¶ 120-25, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?docid=181584&doclang=en [https://perma.cc/J2L2-SBN6];
102. Case C-157/15, Achbita, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ¶ 118,
103. Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, ¶ 118.
104. Case C-157/15, Achbita, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ¶ 116.
105. See id.
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did not wear a headscarf when she commenced employment with
Micropole. Advocate General Kokott concluded that the measure of
restraint, which an employee can be required to exercise, “depends
on a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant circumstances of
the case in question.” 106
In Bougnaoui, Advocate General Sharpston likewise
acknowledged that a person’s level of observance might make
particular rules “non-compulsory” and “therefore negotiable.” 107
Some practices might not be regarded as essential by the employee
and, if asked by the employer to refrain from observing them, he or
she might agree to this request. 108 Where a practice is essential to an
employee, the matter remains a question of negotiation with the
employer in order to find a solution that can be found which
accommodates their respective rights: the right of the employee to
practice or manifest her religious belief and the employer’s right to
conduct her business. 109
As to Article 16 of the Charter, Advocate General Kokott asserted
that “it would appear, on an objective examination taking into account
the employer’s discretion in pursuit of his business, by no means
unreasonable for a receptionist such as Ms. Achbita to have to carry out
her work in compliance with a particular dress code.” 110 In a crucial
passage, she stated:
. . . An undertaking can and must, by definition, take into careful
account the preferences and wishes of its business partners, in
particular its customers, in its business practices. It would
otherwise be unable to sustain its presence on the market. It
nonetheless cannot pander blindly and uncritically to each and
every demand and desire expressed by a third party. If, for
example, a customer, even an important customer, sought to make
a demand on an undertaking to the effect that he be served only by
employees of a particular religion, ethnic origin, colour, sex, age
or sexual orientation, or only by employees without a disability,
this would quite obviously not constitute a legitimate objective . . .
. 111
106. Id. ¶ 117.
107. Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, ¶ 118.
108. See id.
109. Id. ¶ 128.
110. Case C-157/15, Achbita, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ¶ 84.
111. Id. ¶¶ 90-91. On the latter point, she referred to Case C-54/07, Opinion of Advocate
General Poiares Maduro, Centrum voor Gelijkheid van Kansen en voor Racismebestrijding v.
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Broadly speaking, Advocate General Sharpston took the same
view, although she attached less importance to the market’s view. She
stated that the employer may take measures with a view to maintaining
harmony within this workforce for the good of the business as a
whole. 112 In particular, she stressed that a business may prohibit
proselytizing, a practice which has “simply no place in the work
context.” 113
Like any constitutional court, the CJEU constantly finds itself
having to balance fundamental rights against one another. In Sky
Österreich, the Court stated that “the assessment of the possible
disproportionate nature of a provision of European Union law must be
carried out with a view to reconciling the requirements of the protection
of those different rights and freedoms and a fair balance between
them.” 114 This may be prove to be quite a challenging task.
Like the principle of proportionality to which it is closely linked,
balancing is open to criticism for its inherently vague nature: “fair
balance” is a vacuous term; and the outcome is bound to vary from case
to case. But what alternative is there? 115 In these circumstances,
cogent and consistent reasoning is of the essence if judgments are to
be persuasive and legal uncertainty is to be kept to the minimum. 116
In this regard, the rulings in Achbita and Bougaouni cannot be
faulted.

Firma
Feryn
NV,
2008,
¶¶
3,
4,
16-18
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62007CC0054&from=GA
[https://perma.cc/2PEYG2LC] (racial discrimination).
112. Case C-157/15, Achbita, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ¶ 116. Similarly, the
ECtHR has recognized that a company may rely on Article 8 ECHR to protect the privacy of its
staff. Bernh Larsen Holding v. Norway, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 90 (2013); Delta Pekárny v. Czech
Republic, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. 279, ¶ 65 (2014).
113. Case C-157/15, Achbita, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ¶ 73.
114. Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich v. Österreichischer Rundfunk, Opinion of Advocate
General Bot, 2012, ¶ 60 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=
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115. See generally Niels Petersen, How to Compare the Length of Lines to the Weight of
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1387 (2013).
116. Thomas Kleinlein, Judicial Law-Making by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of
Balancing in International Economic Law, 12 GER. L. J. 1141, 1167 (2011).
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C. Divorce and remarriage: the case of the Catholic doctor
The case of IR v JQ raised the novel issue of graded
discrimination. 117 Could a religious organization demand of its
employee, practicing that religion, adherence to certain tenets of that
faith, which it did not demand of its employees who were not of that
religious persuasion or who did not practice any religion? Could such
an organization discriminate between its own employees?
JQ is a Catholic. He is a doctor by training and had been
working as the Head of the Internal Medicine Department of an IR
hospital located in Dusseldorf. He was married according to the
Roman Catholic rite. Following his divorce under German civil law,
JQ remarried in a civil ceremony. At the date of his second marriage,
his first marriage not been annulled under canon law. On learning of
the second marriage, IR terminated the employment relationship. IR
would have tolerated his remarriage if JQ were a non-Catholic head
of department. JQ challenged the validity of his dismissal, arguing
that it infringed the principle of equal treatment. IR asserted that the
dismissal in question was justified. Given that JR was in a
managerial position, he clearly infringed his obligations under his
employment relationship with IR by entering in to a marriage, which
was invalid under canon law. 118
The Federal Labor Court asked whether Article 4(2) of the
Framework Employment Directive could be interpreted as meaning
that the Catholic Church can require an organization such as IR,
where employees in managerial positions are under an obligation to
act in good faith and with loyalty, to differentiate between
employees who belong to the church and those who belong to
another faith or to no faith at all? 119 The Court held that it was for
the national court to determine whether requiring only employees in
managerial positions who share the religion or belief on which the
church or organization concerned is based to act in good faith and
with loyalty is in fact a “genuine, legitimate and justified”
requirement. 120 It then proceeded, in the guise of offering guidance
to the national court to set out its view of the matter. The requirement
117. Case C-68/17, IR v. JQ, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, ¶ 55, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62017CC0068&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/KC8K-JXDG].
118. Id. ¶ 28.
119. Id. ¶ 3.
120. Id. ¶ 56.
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at issue concerned a particular aspect of the ethos of the Catholic
Church, namely the “sacred and indissoluble” nature of marriage. 121
The Court held that adherence to the notion of marriage did not
appear to be necessary for the promotion of IR’s ethos, bearing in
mind the activities carried out by JR, namely the provision of
medical advice and care in a hospital and the management of the
internal medicine department of that hospital. 122 This conclusion
was supported by the fact that positions of medical responsibility,
entailing managerial duties, similar to those performed by JQ, were
entrusted to IR employees who were not of the Catholic faith and
consequently not subject to the same requirement to act in good faith
and with loyalty to IR’s ethos. 123 However, the Court went on to say
that although the requirement in issue did not appear to be justified,
it was ultimately a matter for the referring court to verify whether IR
had established that there was a “probable and substantial” risk of
undermining its ethos or its right of autonomy if it were not
respected. 124
VII. CONCLUSION
Ensuring respect for the freedom of religion is not, and was never
intended to be, part of the EU’s “core business.” 125 That is primarily a
matter for the ECtHR. Having said that, ensuring respect for “human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights” is central to the EU, as is spelt out in Article 2 of the
TEU–but only within the scope of the EU treaties.
In view of the extreme sensitivity of the cases which have come
before it, the CJEU should be applauded for treading most warily.
Fortunately for the Court, it has not been called upon to rule only in
proceedings involving Islam: as we have seen, a number of the most
important rulings have related to Christianity. This puts the Court in
the comfortable position of being seen to be even-handed.
121. Id. ¶ 66.
122. Id. ¶ 59.
123. See id. ¶ 67.
124. Id. ¶ 65.
125. Daniel Sarmiento appears to lament this, writing: “In sixty years of European
integration, religion has been a missing part of Europe’s narrative, both in policy and in law.”
Daniel Sarmiento, Religion at the Court, DESPITE OUR DIFFERENCES (July 17, 2018),
https://despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com/2018/07/17/religion-at-the-court/
[https://perma.cc/J7VZ-4TEL].
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As is clear from this Article, the one judgment which is a cause
for major concern is the ruling in Liga de Moskeeën, which
controversially introduces a de minimis rule into the Charter and fails
to respect the freedom of religion. In any event, the Court can scarcely
be accused of failing to take this area of the law seriously: precisely
because of its great sensitivity, all these cases have been decided by the
Grand Chamber.
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